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Strategic alliances of one sort or another have become common practice in manufacturing 
industry for many years (Harrigan, 1985, 1986, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Nielsen, 1988). 
The term 'Strategic Alliance' is used to refer to 'a coalition of a number of organizations 
intended to achieve mutually beneficial goals' (Robinson and Clarke-Hill, 1994). One can 
make a distinction between vertical and horizontal alliances. Vertical alliances focus on 
supplier-manufacturer relationships (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Forest, 1990; Harrigan 
1985, 1986, 1988; Mody, 1993), or on the manufacturer-distributor relationships (Anderson 
and Narus, 1984, 1990; Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Frazier, 1983; Frazier, Spekman and 
O'Neil, 1988; Johnston and Lawrence, 1988). Horizontal alliances consist of relationships 
between similar firms in the same industry, for example retailers. 
Over the past decades the number of small and medium sized retailing firms that joined a 
strategic alliance has grown rapidly. The strategic position of these alliances in the retail 
industry is significant. In the Netherlands the strategic alliances in 1994 accounted for 44% 
of the total retail business (See Table 1). 
 
  >>>>insert table 1<<<< 
 
The figures in Table 1 show a growing market share for both strategic alliances and fully 
integrated retailers. The growth of the market share of the strategic alliances in the retail 
industry has led to considerable research interest, especially in franchising (Justis and Chan, 
1991; Peterson and Dant, 1990; Stern and Stanworth, 1994; Withane, 1991). The two main 
forms of strategic alliances in retailing are franchising and the voluntary association. The 
voluntary associations can be subdivided in wholesaler and retailer sponsored cooperatives. 
Except for ownership differences, wholesaler and retail-sponsored cooperatives operate 
similarly. During the last decades the scope of their cooperative efforts has broadened from a 
concentrated buying power to include a vast number of programs involving centralized 
consumer advertising and promotion, store location and layout, training, financing, ac-
counting, and in some cases a total package of support services (Stern and El-Ansary, 1992, 
p.339). The term strategic alliance in our study will refer to this modern voluntary 
associations in the retail industry. 
Porter & Fuller (1986) and Dunning (1988) formulate a number of potential benefits for a 
member of a strategic alliance. For a small retail firm joining a strategic alliance, these 
benefits include: 
1)  economies of scale and scope on the buying and selling function of the retailer, as well 
as on the organizational infrastructure (for example a central computer system for all 
members of the strategic alliance); 
2)  quick and easy access to knowledge; 
3)  the reduction of capital requirements and risks involved in the development of new 
service programs, products or technologies; and 
4)  the possibility of influencing the structure of competition in the relevant markets. 
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Regarding the above mentioned benefits, it is to be expected that participating in a strategic 
alliance will influence the strategic behavior of its members. In our study we will focus on 






Yasuda and Mulford (1990) report the most important reasons for retailers to join a strategic 
alliance in Japan are: future developments and expansion; future security of the firm; increase 
of trust in your firm; ease of obtaining information; mutual assistance among small firms; and 
to improve efficiency through cooperation. 
In a study on 32 cases Nielsen (1988) found that cooperation within a strategic alliance can 
increase efficiency. The market approach of a retailer sponsored cooperative was also 
considered to be more efficient in comparison to the market approach of non-allied firms. 
From these studies the hypothesis may be formulated that participating in a strategic alliance 
will lead to a more efficient execution of organizational and marketing tasks by the 
participating retailers. This influence of the strategic alliance can be operationalized by the 
level of outsourcing of organizational and marketing tasks by the small retailing firm to the 




A franchise arrangement is said to increase the competitive advantage of the franchisee 
(Knight 1986). The same can be said for membership of a strategic alliance. 
However it remains unclear how the competitive advantage of being a member of a strategic 
alliance will affect strategic market behavior. Pilling (1991) found that there was a significant 
positive correlation between the attitude of the retailers towards a franchise relationship and 
four entrepreneurial tasks:  -1- the ability to control inventory shrinkage; -2- merchandising 
and marketing (assistance) for increasing sales; -3- cost control; -4- (assistance in) complying 
with government regulations. The relationship of voluntary membership of a strategic 
alliance with entrepreneurial activities in the marketplace is however not heavily researched 
at.  
As we hypothesize a member of a strategic alliance to outsource more tasks to the strategic 
alliance we expect the retailer to have more time and attention available to devote to entre-
preneurial tasks at the marketplace. Therefore, we expect the members of a strategic alliance 
to be more active in their marketing performance. More specifically we hypothesize them to 
have a more competitive price level, to have a distinguishable assortment and to advertise 
more actively than the non-allied retailers. 
Withane (1991) found that many small firms choose to join a strategic alliance (franchising) 
over starting an independent business because of the established business format, the good-
will and the start-up and ongoing support. 
We expect the members of a retailer-sponsored cooperative to benefit from the support of 
their strategic alliance. More specific, we expect the influence of the strategic alliance to lead 
the individual small retailing firms to attain a higher level of professionalism within their 
firm. 
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Performance 
Gordon & Dollinger (1993) found a positive correlation between the number of interorgani-
zational relationships (networking), sales and profitability.  Firms that use any type of 
interorganizational network had a higher average three years' sales. Interorganizational 
relationships were found to be instrumental in helping small firm profitability and thus 
endure over time. From this finding we expect that being a member of a retailer sponsored 
cooperative will have a positive effect on the performance of the small retailing firm. 
 
Set Up of the Study  
  
The research focuses on small sized men's wear retailing firms. In 1994 the market share of 
the fully integrated retailers in men's wear in the Netherlands is 45%. The allied and non-
allied small retailing firms have a marketshare of 35% respective 20%. The allied retailing 
firms are allied within 11 strategic alliances. All of these alliances can be characterized as a 
retailer-sponsored cooperative that offer a number of programs involving centralized consu-
mer advertising and promotion, store location and layout, training, financing, accounting, 
central creditor payment facilities and in some cases a total package of support services. 
Retailers are free to make use of the service package of the alliance.  
The study was conducted in two phases. In the first part of the study the managing (marke-
ting) directors of all the retailer-sponsored cooperatives were interviewed. The purpose of 
these in depth interviews was to get an insight into the role of the strategic alliance in relation 
to the allied retail-members. Special attention was given to the distribution functions, the 
retail mix and the shop formula, as well as on the support the strategic alliance can give to the 
individual retailers. 
In the second phase a written survey among small sized retailers of men's wear was executed. 
The questionnaire was sent to all the allied and non-allied small retailing firms selling men's 
wear. In total 1322 questionnaires were sent out (670 non-allied and 652 allied). A response 
of 451 usable cases has been obtained: 217 non-allied and 234 allied retailers. This response 
of 34.1% is to be considered representative (chi-square is 0.171) for the population of small 
retailing firms selling men's wear. 
The questionnaire included indicators of professional performance; market performance with 
respect to pricing, product/assortment portfolio, and promotional activities. An additional 
oral survey was conducted among 88 retailers, representative for the population with regard 
to the organizational and marketing task evaluation. In addition to this, the  financial perfor-
mance derived from the year books, profit and loss accounts as consolidated by the financial 





Cooperating within a strategic alliance means a loss of independence but also to have help on 
the multiple demand of managing a small business. Curran et. al. (1993), using the critical 
incidents technique, found that motives for networking include stress release, emotional 
support, advice, information, and solving specific problems. Within the managerial school of 
entrepreneurship networking serves the management of tasks defined as part of entrepre-
neurship.  In our study, the tendency to outsource organizational and marketing tasks to 
others was investigated (See Table 2).  
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The tasks most frequently sourced out both by allied and non-allied retailers are: market 
research (A (allies) 44%,  NA (non-allies) 40%), advertising (A 50%, NA 37%), making 
agreements with suppliers (A 42%, NA 25%), and the choice of the additional merchandise 
(A 41% and NA 27%). 'Regular pricing', 'branding', 'window-dressing' and 'human resource 
management' are for both type of retailers tasks they are not inclined to source out: all of 
these tasks score less than 10% outsourcing. The tendency to outsource is significantly higher 
for the allied retailers in comparison with the non-allied retailers with respect to 'regular 
assortment selection', and 'interior decoration'. The allied retailers are however not inclined to 
outsource 'action/sales pricing', while some non-allied retailers would consider this to leave 
that to the strategic alliance.   
The results of table 2 show the entrepreneurial task evaluation not to be very different be-
tween allied and non-allied retailers. Not surprisingly we see a higher tendency to board out 
with the allied than with the non-allied retailers that coincides with their actual behavior. 
 
Marketing behavior 
We also investigated the marketing behavior of allied versus non-allied retailers. In table 3 
the differences between allied and non-allied retailers in marketing behavior: pricing, 
assortment composition, and promotional activities, are presented. 
 
  >>>>insert table 3<<<< 
 
The allied retailers have a significantly lower average price level than the non-allied retailers. 
For both parts of their assortments:  clothes and accessories, this is found. The self-rated 
price level also shows differences between allied and non-allied retailers: The allied retailers  
rate themselves more often as medium to highly priced whereas the non-allied retailers think 
they have either a low or a high price-level. The non-allied retailers have a somewhat 
different assortment: less often modern and more often trendy. The price level for this latter 
group is the one rated as highest. This group of non-allied retailers has chosen for a niche 
strategy: trendy assortments with a high price level. The non-allied entrepreneur has a more 
narrow assortment than the allied colleague: 52.6% of the turnover is made by only three top 
brands as compared with 39.0% in the allied group. In promotional activities the allied 
retailers are far more active than the non-allied. In general door-to-door and newspaper 
advertising, in direct mail activities, and in specific promotional activities the allied entrepre-
neur scores higher. The same goes for a more modern communication technique like the use 
of a customer card. The allied retailers therefore make significantly more use of an 
advertising agency. Yasuda and Mulford (1990) found that for small retail businesses, a 
strategic alliance seems to provide an aggressive alternative to being alone. Together small 
businesses can hope not only to survive but even to compete against large department stores. 
This study gives support to the hypothesis that this aggressiveness also shows when 




Justis and Chan (1991) found that there is a tremendous need for retailers and franchisers 
who understand that training affects the overall success of the franchise organization. 
Training programs provide the lifeblood of qualified individuals to the heart of the orga-  5   
 
nization, and stimulate the level of professionalism in the franchise system. We included 
several indicators for professionalism in our study: the degree of automation; the availability 
of information about the market, the competitors, and internal information, as well as the 
degree of service to the clients. For each of these professionalism indicators a list of activities 
was made. The entrepreneur could score on these (5 to 10) activities per indicator. The allied 
entrepreneur scores significantly (p<.05) higher on automation, 48% of the maximal score 
versus 17% for the non-allied entrepreneur. The allied retailer has more information about the 
market, (75% vs 33%), also more internal company information (47% vs 24%). He scores not 
significantly higher on information on competitors (39% vs 22%), however realizes signifi-
cantly more activities and facilities to serve the clients (57% vs 42%). On all indicators for 
professionalism the average allied outperforms the non-allied retailer. 
 
Performance 
Chell and Haworth (1992) compare 25 shops in the UK clothing industry by identifying their 
financial and their competitive position. The 6 best performing stores show a clear strategy 
towards specialists niche markets with an aggressive pursuing of this strategy. The influence 
of the interorganizational relationships or strategic alliances was however not included in 
their study. Golden and Dollinger (1993) study whether interorganizational relationships 
correlate with strategic type and small firm performance. They concluded that few small 
firms function without some degree of interorganizational relationships. Those that use fewer 
of these networks tend to be associated with less successful adaptations. The results may also 
imply that interorganizational relationships help small firm profitability and thus endure over 
time. Firms that use any type of interorganizational network had a higher three-years average 
sales than those that did not. 
In our study we put in considerable effort to collect financial information from all the retai-
lers. From the consolidated yearbooks and the profit and loss accounts, turnover and profit 
measures were derived.  Table 4 gives an overview of the results. 
 
  >>>>insert table 4<<<< 
Gross turnover and gross profit comparison between allied and non-allied retailers show 
significant differences: the average turnover per outlet is for the allied entrepreneur 1.000.000 
guilders (approximately $ 625.000) versus 760.000 guilders (approximately $ 475.000) for 
the non-allied entrepreneur. Also the profit differences are significantly higher for the allied 
than the non-allied retailer. When we compare the other productivity and profit figures the 
allied do not clearly outperform the non-allied retailers. The turnover per square meters sel-
ling space, and per square meters shop space are significantly higher for the non-allied. This 
can be explained as the allied retailer has an average larger shop (291 square meters) than the 
non-allied retailer (155 square meters). The gross profit per fte is for the allied retailer 
somewhat higher than for the non-allied retailer. The higher gross profit margin of 40.5% 
combined with the lower price level reported earlier, indicates a competitive and profitable 
entrepreneur when compared to the non-allied entrepreneur. The overall impression of the 
turnover and profit comparison is that allied retailers perform better than the non-allied 
retailers with a larger shop, a higher turnover, a higher profit and better margins. 
 
Conclusions 
Retailers allied in a voluntary cooperation with regard to buying and selling, perform better 
than non-allied colleagues.  
Our study shows that other forms of alliances than franchise systems, i.e. voluntary coop-  6   
 
erations in the retail industry,  can be profitable for the allies. In our study the strategic allian-
ces have a supporting function. The influence of the alliance on the performance of the 
retailer is to be considered an indirect one. The level of professionalism of the allied retailer 
is higher compared to his non-allied colleague. On the basis of a higher degree of pro-
fessionalism, supported by the strategic alliance, the allied retailers show more aggres-
siveness towards the market. They show more willingness to outsource several entrepre-
neurial tasks to the strategic alliance. In this way they realize economies of scale. The end 
result for the allies is a higher performance and a higher profit level. 
Gordon & Dollinger (1993) conclude that very small firms have limited personnel perfor-
ming multiple functions. The time-management problem created by this constraint suggests 
that these small firms would use fewer strategic alliances. Therefore small firms might invest 
less energy in strategic alliances regardless of their approach to strategy, while mid-size 
(small) firms may be the most interorganizational-relationship-intensive. In accordance with 
Gordon & Dollinger we also found that small retailing firms, participating in a strategic alli-
ance, tend to be bigger in size than non allied firms. The question arises whether the 
differences in performances found are caused by differences due to size or to membership of 
strategic alliances. Regression analyses on sales with the different size indicators: store size 
and labor force, and membership as predictors show the size indicators to be responsible for 
the differences in sales volume. Similar analyses on gross profit margin show a very 
significant (p<<.001) effect of membership of the strategic alliance. So both size difference 
and membership of the strategic alliance show separate effects on the performance measures.  
Previous research stresses the benefits of the franchise system (Chan & Justin, 1992; Peterson 
and Dant, 1990; Pilling, 1991). The more balanced interdependence of allies and strategic 
alliance within a voluntary cooperation leads to a relatively good performance too. This is in 
line with the findings of Buchannan (1992), who found that a strong, balanced interorganiza-
tional relationship has a positive effect on the performance: '...... the evidence suggests that 
such relationships can be instrumental to the firm's ability to improve the outcomes in 
relation to the stated objectives.' This raises the question how a strategic alliance in the retail 
industry should be organized. An explanation for the success of both systems, i.e. the fran-
chise system and the voluntary buying and selling cooperation, could be found in the turbu-
lence of the market environment; the nature of the goods sold (fast moving versus durable 
consumer goods); and the attitude of the  entrepreneur towards commercial cooperation. Our 
study sheds some light on these topics. Further research however, should focus on the diffe-
rences that exist between the different forms of strategic alliances in the retail industry, and 
the different relative performance of these different kinds of alliances. Then the question 
'what kind of strategic alliance is most profitable in what kind of situation? ' can be more 
fully addressed. 
Another important issue is whether the better performance of the allied retailers is an output 
of the cooperation or that only good operating retailers will be part of a strategic alliance. 
Based on the average time the interviewed respondents participated within a strategic 
alliance, on average more than 20 years, we might suggest that the influence of the strategic 
alliance be dominant. But a full explanation for this problem is only to be found by means of 
longitudinal research. Another interesting issue involves the influence of individual 
differences between allied and non-allied retailers e.g., in thinking styles, cooperativeness, on 
entrepreneurial behavior. This might lead to more in depth insight into the motivation to join 
a strategic alliance as well as their performance.  
The indications from this study are that membership of a strategic alliance based on 
voluntariness fits with entrepreneurial behavior that can be typified as professional, active   7   
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Table 1: Market shares of Strategic Alliances in the Dutch retail trade 
 
    market share (%) 
    1980    1985    1990  1993  1994 
- Non-Allied SME's*    44    31    24  20  18 
- SME's within Strategic Alliances    29    35    40  43  44 
- Fully integrated retailers    27    34    36  37  38 
 Total    100    100    100  100  100 
 
* SME: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿    12   
 
 
Table 2: Organizational and marketing tasks: tendency to outsource by allied and non-allied 
small retailing firms (allied N= 61; non-allied N=27) 
 
   organizational and marketing tasks 
  tendency to outsource 
  (in %) 
    allied  non-allied    t-value 
-1- regular assortment selection    39    4    3.97* 
-2- additional merchandise selection    41    27    .78 
-3- regular pricing    3    0    .22 
-4- action/sales pricing    0    7    -2.86* 
-5- determination of specific sales actions    8    14    -.07 
-6- making agreements with suppliers    42    25    1.52 
-7- choosing the suppliers    20    7    1.53 
-8- interior decoration    23    4    2.25* 
-9- exterior decoration    15    7    1.04 
-10- branding    7    4    1.10 
-11- window-dressing    5    7    -.37 
-12- house styling    21    7    1.62 
-13- merchandise control    10    22    -1.51 
-14- human resource management    5    4    .20 
-15- shop location    10    7    .45 
-16- advertising    50    37    1.40 
-17- market research    44    40    .35 
average score    20.2    13.1    5.24* 
Legend: *  = p of t-value < .05   13   
 
 
Table 3: Marketing behavior: allied versus non-allied retailers (N=451) 
  marketing behavior    allied    non-allied    t-value 
PRICING 
- average price level    ¦ 338    ¦ 368    -2.47* 
- price level ac-
cording to the 
respondents 
- low to medium 
- medium 
-medium to high  
-high 
   3.4% 
  37.6% 
  50.9% 
   8.1% 
  9.2% 
  35.0% 
  41.5% 
  14.3% 
  -2.56* 
  .57 
  2.01* 
  -2.09* 
ASSORTMENT 





  38.6% 
  56.4% 
    5.0% 
  46.9% 
  41.7% 
  11.4% 
  -1.78 
  3.12* 
  -2.49* 
- turnover share three most important 
brands 
  39.0%    52.6%    -5.57* 
- number of collections per year    2.2    2.1    .31 
- average markup    2.28    2.27    .05 
- % of pre-ordering    78.7%    75.3%    2.04* 
ADVERTISING 
- media advertising    79.9%    53.0%    6.06* 
- direct mail    73.5%    50.7%    4.99* 
- special offers    23.1%    12.4%    2.96* 
- customer card    14.5%     8.3%    2.06* 
- use of advertising agency    56.7%    23.1%    7.28* 
 
legend: ¦ = one Dutch guilder ($ = ¦ 1.60) 
 * = p of t-value <.05   14   
 
 
Table 4: Differences in productivity and profitability: allied versus non-allied  (N =227) 
 
Performance    allied  #  non-allied  #  t-value 
PRODUCTIVITY 
- turnover per full-time equivalent   ¦ 278,099  179  ¦ 266,092  188    1.17 
- turnover per labor hour    ¦ 141  231    ¦ 132  217    .99 
- turnover per m
2 selling space    ¦ 5,965  230    ¦ 7,475  211  -2.00* 
- turnover per m
2 shop space    ¦ 4,341  230    ¦ 5,307  209  -2.21* 
- speed of turnover    3.3  61    3.0  27    1.16 
- average turnover per outlet  ¦1,059,373  232  ¦ 762,000  217   3.71* 
PROFITABILITY 
- gross profit   ¦ 433,717  232  ¦ 298,200  208   4.12* 
- gross profit margin    40.1%  232    37.5%  208   5.63* 
- gross profit per m² selling space    ¦ 2,397  230    ¦ 2,888  203    1.61 
- gross profit per fte   ¦ 111,224  179  ¦ 100,272  188   1.96* 
- gross profit per labor hour    ¦ 56  207    ¦ 50  194   1.96* 
 
legend: # = number of respondents; ¦ = one Dutch guilder ($ = ¦ 1.60); fte=unit labor (full 
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Strategic Alliances among Small Retailing Firms: Empirical Evidence from the Nether-
lands, by Will J.M. Reijnders and Theo M.M. Verhallen. 
 
This study focuses on the influence of a strategic alliance on strategic behavior of small 
retailing firms. The study compares allied and non-allied retailers on the evaluation of entre-
preneurial tasks; differences in market approach; the degree of professionalism, and their 
financial performance. In total 217 non-allied and 234 allied retailers from the men's cloths 
retail branch in the Netherlands were interviewed. The financial results were drawn from the 
company's yearbooks. The findings show that membership of a strategic alliance has a posi-
tive effect on the performance of retailers. Allied retailers perform better: they have a more 
professional and active market approach and they realize a higher profit. 